onsdag, november 30, 2011

Stor islamistseger i egyptiska valet !

Officiella siffror från den första valomgången
i Egypten lär dröja ytterligare några dagar.
en entydig bild:
Överlägsen segrare är Muslimska Brödraskapet,
tvåa det salafistiska Nourpartiet och trea det
sekulära Egyptiska Blocket, som framförallt
stöds av kopterna. Valdeltagandet översteg 70 %.
Hittills är det bara storstäderna Kairo
och Alexandria samt nio provinser som
röstat. Övriga delar av landet kommer att
rösta vid två tillfällen i december och januari.
 Väljarna röstar både partilistor och i
enmansvalkretsar. Om ingen får egen
majoritet i enmansvalkretsarna blir det
en extra valomgång en vecka efter
ordinarie omröstning. 
Läs gårdagens prognos:

Hur OIC bekämpar yttrandefriheten över hela världen

Hudson Institute har precis publicerat
en exposé i New English Review över
hur de 57 (!) medlemsstaterna i 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation
systematiskt bekämpar all kritik mot
islamismen genom att inskränka yttrande-
Next to my desk is a framed autographed
lithograph of the Muhammad cartoon with
a bomb–shaped turban drawn by Kurt
Westergaard in 2005 and published along
with 11 others in the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten. It was a gift for an interview 
I did with the feisty Westergaard when he was
in North America in the fall of 2009.
We had arranged an event for him in Manhattan.
Westergaard’s cartoon had spurred riots, massive
property damage to Danish Embassies and more
than 200 deaths across the Muslim Ummah in
2006. Many believe those riots were orchestrated
by the 57 member nation Organization of the Islamic
Conference (renamed the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation in June, 2011). Westergaard’s caricature
of a terrorist Muhammad caused the second great
arc of Islamic outrage over artistic license and
alleged blasphemy.
Läs också

tisdag, november 29, 2011

SÅ HÄR går det i egyptiska valet....

Hudson Institute har gjort en god
sammanfattning av vad vi kan
vänta oss av det egyptiska valet.
Vid första omgången igår röstade
storstäderna Kairo och Alexandria.
1. The question is not whether the Islamists
will win, but what the size of their victory is
going to be. Contrary to the earlier narrative
propagated by the Western media, the Islamist
victory will not be in the 30–40 percent range.
It is quite apparent to anyone that has been
paying attention that their victory will be nothing
short of a tsunami.
2. The real battle is not going to be between the
Islamists and the imagined liberals. The struggle
in most Egyptian governates will be between the
Muslim Brotherhood’s Democratic Alliance and
the more radical Salafist Islamic Alliance.
3. The imagined sleeping giant of Sufism that could
counter the Islamists is nothing more than a pipe
dream. The Sufi Egyptian Liberation Party is fielding
only 15 candidates in the elections and none of them
is expected to win.
4. The much-talked-about splits inside the Brother-
hood, mainly among their youth, are another pipe
dream. None of the people and parties formed by
former MB members will perform well.
5. The Egyptian Bloc will be the largest non-Islamist
party represented in the next parliament. More than
95 percent of Christians are voting for the Bloc due
to Christians’ support for the Free Egyptian Party,
which is the main party in the Bloc’s three-party
6. Western polling that gave the Wafd the second
rank after the MB will turn out to be wrong. El Wafd
will be the election’s largest losers. The only reason
they polled well was name recognition and not actual
7. The elections will indicate the actual size of the
revolutionary groups. Their Revolution Continues
Coalition will perform very poorly.

Antisemitiska incidenter ökar med 31 %

Australien uppfattar vi kanske inte
som något centrum för judehat, men
likväl har antalet antisemitiska incidenter
där ökat med 31 % i år, rapporterar Your
JEWS in Australia faced 517 incidents of
harassment or intimidation in the year to
September 30, a 31 per cent rise from the
year before, according to the Jewish community's
annual report on anti-Semitism.
"Put bluntly, in Australia this year, 10 times a
week, every week, Jewish Australians were
attacked or threatened," report author Jeremy
Jones said yesterday.
It is the 22nd year that Mr Jones, community
affairs director for the Australia/Israel & Jewish
Affairs Council, has produced the report, which
showed a 38 per cent increase over the average
of the previous 21 years but an 80 per cent drop
on the record tally (2009).
Between October 1, 2010, and September 30 this
year, there were 17 physical assaults or property
damage, 128 incidents of direct harassment and
intimidation, five threatening phone calls, 301
emails, 48 incidents of anti-Jewish graffiti, and 18
other incidents.
Mr Jones said the total did not include anti-Israel
incidents or those where motivation was in doubt.
While anti-Jewish violence had little public support,
anti-Semitic comments "find comfortable hosts on
the online sites of mainstream media outlets,
including government-owned", he said.
He said Australians needed to treat hate crimes
seriously. The property damage or injury might
be slight, but the impact on the victim and the
community might be significant.
The media should not allow comments online
that they would not print or broadcast.
"It is time mainstream media and others grew up.
The online world can no longer be regarded as
some sort of alternative reality," Mr Jones said.
"Just as most church groups have managed to
psychologically distance themselves from pseudo-
Christian racists, mainstream Muslims, leftists,
rightists and others need to identify racists as just
that — bigots undeserving of a place."

måndag, november 28, 2011

I Libyen vajar Al Qaedas flagga....

Videojournalisten Sherif Elhelwa på Vice
skulle undersöka om det verkligen stämmer
att Al Qaedas flagga vajar över många officiella
byggnader i det nya Libyen.
Det gjorde det....
It was here at the courthouse in Benghazi where the first
spark of the Libyan revolution ignited. It’s the symbolic
seat of the revolution; post-Gaddafi Libya’s equivalent
of Egypt’s Tahrir Square. And it was here, in the tumultuous
months of civil war, that the ragtag rebel forces established
their provisional government and primitive, yet effective,
media center from which to tell foreign journalists about their
“fight for freedom.”
But according to multiple eyewitnesses—myself included—
one can now see both the Libyan rebel flag and the flag of
al Qaeda fluttering atop Benghazi’s courthouse.
According to one Benghazi resident, Islamists driving brand-
new SUVs and waving the black al Qaeda flag drive the city’s
streets at night shouting, "Islamiya, Islamiya! No East, nor
West," a reference to previous worries that the country would
be bifurcated between Gaddafi opponents in the east and the
pro-Gaddafi elements in the west.
Earlier this week, I went to the Benghazi courthouse and
confirmed the rumors: an al Qaeda flag was clearly visible;
its Arabic script declaring that “there is no God but Allah”
and a full moon underneath.
When I tried to take pictures, a Salafi-looking guard, wearing
a green camouflage outfit, rushed towards me and demanded
to know what I was doing. My response was straightforward:
I was taking a picture of the flag. He gave me an intimidating
look and hissed, "Whomever speaks ill of this flag, we will
cut off his tongue. I recommend that you don't publish these.
You will bring trouble to yourself.”
He followed me inside the courthouse, but luckily my driver
Khaled was close by, and interceded on my behalf.
According to Khaled, the guard had angrily threatened to
harm me. When I again engaged him in conversation, he
told me "this flag is the true flag of Islam," and was un-
responsive when I argued with him that historically Islam
has never been represented by a single flag.
The guard claimed repeatedly that there is no al Qaeda in
Libya, and that the flag flying atop the courthouse is “dark
black,” while the al Qaeda flag is charcoal black. To many
locals, it’s a distinction without a difference.
One man approached me with a friendly warning:
"I recommend that you leave now; [the Islamist fighters]
could be watching you."
But none of this should be surprising. In Tripoli, Abdelhakim
Belhaj, a well-known al Qaeda fighter and founder of the
notorious Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), is now
leading the rebel “military counsel” in Tripoli.
A few weeks ago, Belhaj ordered his fighters to take command
of the Tripoli airport, then controlled by a group of Zintan
fighters, a brigade of Berber Libyans who helped liberate the
capital from Gaddafi loyalists. A few days later, Belhaj gave a
speech emphasizing that his actions had the blessings of the
NTC, who appointed him to the leadership of Tripoli’s military
Michael J Totten kommenterar bilden:
Al Qaeda doesn’t control Libya,
but it’s obviously present and coming
out of the shadows.
And there’s no chance whatsoever that
Al Qaeda will participate in elections and
lose gracefully. If Libya’s authorities don’t
do something about this, and fast,
they—and we—should expect hell.
Och vad är det som vajar över Tahrirtorget i Kairo ?

Terrorist martyr i Tunisien

Islamisterna i Tunisien markerar tydligt
de nya tiderna efter sin valseger i parlaments-
valet för några veckor sedan.
I helgen avbröts allt arbete i stora delar av
landet för att hylla den salafistiske martyren
och terroristen Yosri Trigui.
för två bombattentat mot shiamoskéer som
han utfört för Al Qaedas räkning. 
Den ena av dem var den kända al-‘Askari 
Moskéen i staden Samarra. Vid oroligheterna
efter bomberna dödades över tusen människor.
Sedan Triguis lik flugits hem till Tunisien har
han oavbrutet hyllats av stora mängder
salafister. Det styrande Muslimska Brödraskapet
var in i det sista engagerade i att försöka få
honom benådad, vilket misslyckades. Någon
kritik mot de islamistiska bombdåden har
däremot inte framförts.....

Drusisk polis försvarade judisk helgedom

Den drusiske gränspolisen Madhat Yusef
mördades 2000 när han försvarade Josefs
Grav, en av judendomens heligaste platser
 i Shechem ("Nablus"), mot en arabisk mobb.
Igår anslöts sig hans bror Tarwat till samma
Deras far säger: Min far Salman tjänstgjorde i
28 år i gränspolisen. Gränspolisen är vårt hem.
- Jag är stolt över att min son Tarwat fortsätter
i min fars och sin brors fotspår och försvarar
Staten Israels säkerhet.
The brother of a soldier whose death on October 1,
2000, is a painful chapter in the IDF's history, has
joined the military and has entered the ranks of
the Border Police, in which his late brother served. 
Eleven years ago, Madhat Yusef, a Druze soldier,
was wounded when an Arab mob stormed Joseph's
Tomb in Shechem.
The IDF did not mount an operation to rescue him,
instead trusting assurances by the Palestinian
Authority (PA) that it would do so itself.
The PA did not assist him, however, and he bled to
death slowly, over the course of four hours.  
Madhat's death is considered to be a stain in the
annals of the IDF, and as contradicting the ethos of
leaving no soldier behind on the battlefield.
He was one of the first casualties of the bloody terror
war that broke out in September 2000, which has come
to be known as the Oslo War or the Second Intifada.
Border Police Commander Maj.-Gen. Yoram Halevy
uncovered Tarwat's combat soldier's pin, newspaper
Yisrael Hayom reported. "My father Salman served
in the Border Police for 28 years," said Mahdi, Tarwat's
father, at the ceremony in which Tarwat was sworn in. 
"The Border Police is our home. I am proud of my son
Tarwat who decided to continue in the path of my father
and Madhat, and to protect the security of the State of

2000 och mördar gränspolisen Madhat Yusef.
Allt under PLO:s överinseende....

fredag, november 25, 2011

Gangster och islamist skjuts i taxikrig

Gangsterledaren Alex Akbar Ghara
Mohammadi, ledande medlem i Brödra-
som verkar handla om kontrollen över
Taxi 23. I ett pressmeddelande betecknar
polisen honom som "känd av Polisen".
Det är nästan årets underdrift....
Mohammadis släkt är irakiska shia och lär
ha intima förbindelser med den pro-iranska
Al Muntadarmoskén, som också har kopplingar
till Hamas och till kommunledningen i Malmö....
Det var fadern Feri Ahmad Ghara Mohammadi,
i somras.
Alex satt samtidigt häktad för mordet på den
serbiske dörrvakten Ziki Dobreva på Norra
Sedan dess har han bl a suttit häktad en tid för
en skottlossning på Munkhättegatan.
Som vanligt fick alla vittnen dåligt minne...
I veckan exploderade en bomb utanför en villa
i Malmös utkanter. Ägare är "Malmös taxikung"
Sardar Albarzindji. Han lär enligt uppgift ha hyrt
Alex som livvakt efter bomben. Alex ska således ha
bitit i gräset "i tjänsten" inne på Taxiverkets  kontor
medan han försökte skydda sin uppdragsgivare.
Sardar anses dock som en hårding som överlevt
många utpressningar och hot. Det ska inte vara första
gången han håller i en pistol. Ordet PKK nämns ibland
i förbindelse med Sardars släkt.....
Samtidigt hävdar några som känner Malmös undre
värld väl att det egentliga motivet till skjutningen
ändå var mordet på Dobreva....
Själv tycker jag det mest fascinerande är
kopplingarna mellan gangstergäng, taxibolag,
terrorister, islamister, mullor, moskéer, kommun-
politiker och annan ekonomisk kriminalitet.  

Kopterna hårt trängda av islamisterna i Egypten

Häromdagen anfölls återigen en koptisk 
procession i Kairo. Kopterna högtidlighöll
de 25 kristna som mördades vid den
s k Masperomassakern 9 oktober och
som helgonförklarats av koptiska kyrkan.
angrepp med stenar, flaskor och käppar.
Återigen lyste polisen med sin frånvaro.
Långt om länge kom en militär enhet, som
gick till angrepp mot både kopter och salafister.
Tio kopter skadades, de flesta av flaskor
kastade från omgivande hus.
Inför måndagens parlamentsval har islamisterna
genom nya upplopp på Tahrirtorget lyckats helt
pacificera militären. Det finns inte längre något
motstånd mot Muslimska Brödraskapet. Alla
Det enda som skulle kunna rädda Egypten är
en s k Atatürklösning, d v s armén tar över
som garant för den demokratiska och sekulära
författningen gentemot partipolitiken.
Det fungerade i Turkiet i drygt femtio år, innan 
lyckades öppna slussportarna för islamismen.
Tyvärr finns det ingen sådan tradition hos den
egyptiska armén.
En seger för Muslimska Brödraskapet och
salafisterna betyder också att utvandringen 
Det är extra tragiskt att Egyptens urbefolkning
fördrivs på detta sätt av invandrare från arabiska

torsdag, november 24, 2011

Niohundra moskéer kontrolleras av Al Qaeda

De algeriska myndigheterna stängde
förra veckan över niohundra (!) moskéer
som använts som mötesplatser av
islamistiska terrorgrupper, skriver
italienska ADN-Kronos, som citerar
tidningen El-Khabar.
Authorities say they Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) was particularly active in
the places of worship where meetings
among militants took place in secret, the
report said.
The prayer halls were opened illegally,
El-Khabar said, ignoring laws requiring
approval by the Ministry of Religious Affairs
before they can be opened.
AQIM grew out of the Salafist Group for
Call and Combat (GSPC), and has its roots
in an Islamist militia involved in the civil war
in the 1990s that cost between 150,000
and 200,000 lives.
In recent years it has expanded its activities
to include Mali, Niger and Mauritania and is
considered by experts to be the most
active Al-Qaeda offshoot.

Libyen - en sharia-stat ?

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs presenterade nyligen en intressant rapport om Libyen från forskaren Jonathan D. Halevi.
Den visade hur den nya regimen med hög hastighet är på väg att etablera en islamistisk stat. Stora bidrag från Qatar och "vägledning" från Muslimska Brödraskapet spelar en central roll i utvecklingen.
En sammanfattning:
On October 23, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC) that is the temporary power in Libya replacing the Gaddafi regime, announced: "We, as an Islamic state, determined that Islamic law is a major source for legislation, and on this basis any law which contradicts the principles of Islam and Islamic law will be considered null and void."
*  The NTC has the support of the West and NATO countries, which helped it militarily to bring down the Gaddafi regime, hoping to establish a democratic regime in Libya.
*  In early October, Dr. David Gerbi, who was born in Libya and fled to Italy in 1967, arrived in Tripoli and asked to repair the synagogue. The NTC was quick to remove him, while demonstrations were held in Tripoli calling to prevent any Jewish presence in Libya or the establishment of synagogues. The NTC did not condemn this expression of anti-Semitism, nor was there any objection by any other political factions in Libya.
*  NTC and Western officials have already stated their growing concerns that Qatar is trying to interfere in the country's sovereignty, and the rebels are said to have received about $2 billion from the Qatari government. Qatari involvement is likely to produce a regime in Libya that follows the political orientation of Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, thereby giving the Muslim Brotherhood an open door in the new Libya.
*  The political debate in Libya will be within an essentially Islamist universe, with different leaders distinguished by the degree to which they seek to implement their Islamism. It seems that the strategy of the democratic states that trusted the promises of the rebel forces to adopt and implement the principles of democracy has collapsed, and that Western aid to overthrow Gaddafi's tyrannical regime prepared the groundwork for the establishment of an Islamic state, which eventually may become hostile to the West.

Holland säger nej till Turkiets president

Turkiets president Abdullah Gül är på
väg till en rundresa i Europa. Bl a tänker
han besöka Holland för att fira "400 års-
minnet" av relationer mellan Ottomanska
imperiet och Holland.
En holländsk tidning påpekade att den
främsta "relationen" på 1600-talet väl
var att köpa loss kristna slavar från
Det enda parti som talat klartext att
Gül inte är välkommen i det demokratiska
Holland är inte oväntat Wilders PVV. De på-
minner om hur det islamistiska Turkiet
diskriminerar sina kristna, judiska och
kurdiska minoriteter och vägrar erkänna
Det tål att påminnas om hur USA:s ambassad
karaktäriserade presidenten i en av Wikileaks-
Amerikanska diplomater beskriver den turkiske
premiärministern Erdogan som "en okunnig
islamist" och hans utrikesminister som en man
med neo-ottomanska fantasier, dåligt informerad
om allt som händer utanför Ankara....
Ännu farligare för Turkiets utrikespolitik är
dock den extreme islamisten president Gül...
Gemensamt för alla de turkiska AKP-politikerna
Låt oss hoppas att Gül inte hittar Sverige
på kartan....
Se även

onsdag, november 23, 2011

Barry Rubins guide till det syriska inbördeskriget

Barry Rubin har skrivit en intressant och
upplysande krönika på Gloria Center om
det som håller på att bli det syriska inbördeskriget.
Vilka är det egentligen som bekämpar Assads
regim ? Vilken är Brödraskapets och salafisternas
roll ? Var står alla landets minoriteter ?
Och inte minst:vilken är de turkiska islamisternas
och den förvirrade amerikanske presidentens roll ? 

1. Don’t overrate Iran’s role.
Despite wild rumors, the Syrian regime doesn’t need Iranians to help it repress the people. Iran is important as a source of financing for the government, but this is President Bashar al-Asad’s battle to win or lose. Tehran is definitely going to be a secondary factor.
Syria’s other ally is Hizballah but the killing of so many Sunni Muslims, including Muslim Brotherhood people, has lost it Hamas. There is a sort of Sunni-Shia version of the Spanish Civil War going on now. But when it comes to the radical and Islamist forces on both sides there’s no good guy.
2. And Turkey isn’t the good guy
The Turkish Islamist regime isn’t motivated by some love of democracy in opposing the Syrian regime. The Ankara government wants a fellow Sunni Islamist dictatorship in Damascus, preferably under its influence. In this situation, Turkey is just as bad as Iran.
3. Will the two sides make a deal?
No, this is a war to the death. The regime cannot make a deal and yield power because the elite would lose everything it has. Moreover, the government elite would face death, exile, or long-term imprisonment if it loses. Similarly, the dominant Alawite community and large portions of the Christian one (together roughly 25 percent of the population) risks massacre if the government falls.
4. Will the army bring down the regime or change sides?
No, see point 3. While some are defecting (see below), the high command cannot survive a change of power. Unlike in Egyptand Tunisia, the armed forces cannot usher in a new regime under which it can hope to keep its privileges.
5. Is this now an inter-communal war?
Net yet. There are hints of small-scale communal killings but if and when such a blood bath begins you’ll know and it will be terrible indeed. This outcome might be avoidable but the situation is very dangerous.
6. Is Syria now in a civil war?
This is beginning. Defectors from the military have formed a Free Syrian Army. A nine-member Military Council has been formed including five colonels. Note the lack of generals (see Point Four) and all of them appear to be Sunni Muslim Arabs (see Point Five). They say they are going to fight the regime and defend the populace. But from where will they get arms?
7. Will economic collapse bring down the regime?
No. See Points 1, 3, and 5. Nobody is going to quit because they get hungry. This is a kill-or-be-killed situation.
8. Is Syria going to encourage a war against Israel?
No. Historically, Middle Eastern dictatorships have provoked war against Israel to distract attention from problems at home. The most likely scenario would be a Hizballah-Israel war, as happened in 2006. But we’re past that point for the Syrian regime (though a radical Egypt might try this tactic after 2013.) In addition, Hizballah is trying to consolidate power in Lebanon and a war would be very much against its interests.
9. Who is the opposition leadership?
Ah, that’s a very interesting question. The best-known group is the Syrian National Council (SNC). It has announced its 19-member leadership group which includes 15 Sunni Muslims, two Christians, and 2 Kurds. Note that there are no Alawites or Kurds. The SNC has an advantage because it was assembled by the United States using the Islamist regime in Turkey.
Given Western backing the SNC is surprisingly dominated by Islamists. Ten of the 19 are identifiable as such (both Muslim Brothers and independent—Salafist?—Islamists) and a couple of those who are nominally leftists are apparently Islamist puppets. The fact that U.S. policy is backing an Islamist-dominated group indicates the profound problems with Obama Administration policy.
It should be stressed, though, that the SNC’s popular support is totally untested. Many oppositionists—especially Kurds—are disgusted by the group’s Islamist coloration and refuse to participate.
The National Coordination Committee (NCC) is a leftist-dominated alternative. The Antalya Group is liberal. There is also a Salafist council organized by Adnan Arour, a popular religious figure; a Kurdish National Council and a Secular Democratic Coalition (both angry at the SNC’s Islamism);
It is hard to overestimate how disastrous Obama Administration policy has been. Not only has it promoted an Islamist-dominated leadership (which might be pushed into power by monopolizing Western aid) but this mistake has fractured the opposition, ensuring there would be several anti-SNC groups. This strategy has also angered the Kurds and Turkmen minorities who view the SNC as antagonistic to their hopes for some autonomy. As a result, these two groups have reduced their revolutionary activities.
The best source on these events is the exiled democrat Ammar Abdulhamid whose daily Syrian Revolution Digest is indispensable to understand what’s going on in the country. He writes that, despite U.S. and Turkish support, nobody will recognize the SNC as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian people” because of its “overrepresentation of certain currents and underrepresentation of others, as well as lack of transparency in the selection and decision-making processes, not to mention lack of clear political vision and transitional plans.”
Again, it should be stressed that in terms of actually directing the rebellion, there is no leadership.
10. So who do we want to win?
Despite the threat of a Sunni Islamist regime, I hope that Asad will be overthrown. Why? If the regime survives we know it will continue to be a ferociously repressive dictatorship, allied with Iran, and dedicated to the destruction of U.S. and Western interests, the imperialist domination of Lebanon, wiping Israel off the map, and subverting Jordan.
With a revolution, there is a chance—especially if U.S. policy doesn’t mess it up—for a real democracy that is higher than in Egypt. In Syria only 60 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim Islamist. The minorities—Alawite, Christian, Druze, and Kurdish—don’t want an Arab Sunni Islamist regime.
As for the Sunnis themselves, they are proportionately more urban, more middle class, and more moderate than in Egypt. Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular have never been as strong in Syria as in Egypt. In Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, the Islamists face what is largely a political vacuum; in Syria they have real, determined opposition.
Today, the Syrian people have two major enemies blocking the way to a moderate stable democracy. One is the regime itself; the other is the U.S.-Turkish policy that is determined—naively for the former; deviously deceitful from the latter—to force a new repressive Islamist regime on the Syrians.
OBS  Skrivfelet i punkt 9 första stycket.
Bör vara Note that there are no Alawites or Druzes