avläggare i bl a Afghanistan, Libyen, Jemen och i Sahel. Deras största svaghet är att de mist de flesta ekonomiska intäktskällorna. Dock, konstaterar rapporten, strömmar det fortfarande in mångmiljonbelopp från bl a utpressning, kid- nappningar och illegal oljeförsäljning.
Rapporten kommenterar märkligt nog inte ISIS
ökade styrka i Västeuropa genom alla "hem-
vändande" jihadister...
Den ger också det missvisande intrycket att
den s k "internationella koalitionen" spelat någon
någon egentlig roll för ISIS nederlag. Koalitionen har ju mest varit ett åskådningsexempel på Västerlandets splittring och svaghet... Som alla intresserade kunnat konstatera är det framförallt Irans, Rysslands och Kurdistans styrkor som tillsammans med Assadregimen och den iranska lydregimen i Irak krossat jihadisterna. Obehagligt men sant.
Det var bara fyra år sedan en utbrytargrupp ur Al Qaeda
utropade det nya Kalifatet Irak/Syrien (ISIS). Under en tid kontrollerade de upp till en tredjedel av båda länderna med en befolkning på 6 till 8 miljoner.
Och nästan lika snabbt försvann de igen.
Efter slutstriderna i Aleppo, Mosul och Raqqa
fanns det egentligen ingenting kvar. Idag behärskar
Det enda positiva är att både syriska och irakiska
Kurdistan överlevt och stärkts till lokala makt- faktorer, som drar till sig alla religiösa och etniska smågrupper.
Tyvärr hatar den PKK-styrda syriska Kurdistans och den traditionalistiska irakiska Kurdistans ledare varandra och vägrar samarbeta, vilket ju skadar Kurdistans sak.
Stater med lite överlevnadsinstinkt (t ex Egypten
och Israel) förbättrar sina relationer med Putins
regim. USA:s intresse för Mellanöstern är uppen-
barligen minskande.
Vad kan man förvänta sig på några års sikt i Irak/Syrien ?
Assadregimen kommer att ytterligare stärka sin
makt och efterhand kontrollera hela Syrien utom
Kurdistan och ett bälte utmed turkiska gränsen.
Centralregeringen kommer fortsatt att vara svag och
istället arbetar man genom att sluta allianser med
de lokala makthavarna i form av klanhövdingar och
olika religiösa och etniska miliser. De miliser som
skapats av USA/EU/Saudiarabien som något slags opposition köps efterhand upp av regeringen.
För Assads lilla minoritetsgrupp alawiterna är detta också en långsiktig överlevnadsstrategi. Bara genom allianser med större grupper kan man garantera sin fortsatta makt (eller ens sin fysiska överlevnad).
En intressant test på vilken kontroll Assad verkligen
utövar blir om han lyckas förbjuda Iran/Hezballah att
I Irak vann milisledaren al-Sadr överraskande valet nyligen, medan de flesta korrupta politiker som USA satsat på sveptes bort. Den stora frågan är om al- Sadr vågar visa någon självständighet gentemot sina iranska finansiärereller om hanblir ännu en i raden av irakiska mutkolvar. Landet är fortsatt oroligt och kontrolleras av stam- hövdingarnas privatarméer och iranska shiamiliser. Kalifatet är krossat, men några stamarméer som varit allierade med ISIS finns kvar.
Kurdistan arbetar långsiktigt för självständighet, men vägen dit är lång. De överlevande kristna och yazidiska smågrupperna inser att deras överlevnadsmöjlighet finns i Kurdistan.
Mellanöstern att explodera (eller kanske implodera).
Risken är stor att det självständiga Kurdistan
efter 25 september kommer att vara omgivet
av bara fiender...
How often do the governments and regimes of the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria agree on the same policy? Next to never. But for once, they are on the same page about an event scheduled to take place a month from now. All are trying, in some cases using threats, to stop the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the semi-autonomous administration of the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, from holding an independence referendum on September 25.
The KRG has declared that the referendum will be “binding” - in other words, if a majority of the 5 million voters choose independence, as is widely expected, they will initiate the breakaway process. Iraq’s Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad has made it clear that they will not recognize the referendum’s results, but it is unclear how they can prevent Kurdish independence.
Iraq’s army is still relatively weak and tied up with fighting ISIS, and it has no bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Kurdish Peshmerga militia controls security and the borders. Iraq can however rely on much more powerful neighbors to oppose the Kurds' departure. It will be a very difficult divorce for both sides.
Last Wednesday, the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, made a rare visit to Ankara. On the agenda was Iran and Turkey’s joint opposition to Kurdish independence. Both countries share borders with Iraqi Kurdistan and have large Kurdish minorities (an estimated three-quarters of all the Kurds in the Middle East live in Turkey and Iran) which could seek to break away and join a new independent Kurdistan.
Turkey’s President Reccep Tayip Erdogan, who until a few years ago supported a peace agreement with the Kurds in his country, has pursued a hard-line nationalist anti-Kurd policy of late, which has included the arrest of most of the members of the HDP Kurdish party. An independent Kurdistan would be a boost for Turkey's Kurdish citizens.
Iran also has additional reasons to block Kurdish independence. The Kurds of Iraq control key border regions with Iran and Syria, regions which Iran plans to dominate to create a land-corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean, thought Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. While, for domestic reasons, Erdogan has been talking up in recent days the prospect of joint Turkish-Iranian action against Kurdish independence in Iraq, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have sought to squelch such talk. It could harm their attempts to push forward military operations already taking place, in which they would prefer for now to cooperate with various Kurdish forces on the ground. But a month from now, if in the wake of the referendum the Kurds seriously embark on the path independence, an Iranian-Turkish alliance to violently quash it is a distinct possibility.
Recognizing that these developments could make matters in the region even more volatile, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis was in the Kurdish capital Erbil this week, urging KRG President Masoud Barazani to postpone the referendum. The US has been working closely both with the Iraqi government and with the Kurds on fighting ISIS both in Iraq and Syria. The American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, which consists mainly of Kurdish fighters, is now at the forefront of the battle for capturing Raqqa, ISIS’ main base in Syria. Kurds are also expected to be heavily involved in the next stage of fighting, against ISIS’ last major strongholds in the Euphrates Valley, on either side of the Syria-Iraq border.
The war against ISIS is currently the only semi-coherent policy the Trump administration has in the Middle East, and Mattis is understandably concerned that a conflict over Kurdish independence will create further discord among what is already a disparate anti-ISIS alliance. But Barazani is extremely unlikely to back down, weeks before the referendum. Since 2014, KRG has de facto been disconnected from the central government in Baghdad.
The Kurds have sought to independently export oil from the rich oilfields around Kirkuk, leading the Iraqi government to cut off allocations from the state budget. As the export has proved problematic and oil prices plummeted, the Kurdish region has been cast into a deep financial crisis. Three years ago, hopes for an energy boom were high in Iraqi Kurdistan, new hotels and office blocks were being built in the main cities, which were linked by new wide highways. “Everything now is at a standstill,” laments one businessman from the city of Dohuk. “The hotels are empty, no investment is coming in and independence seems like the solution to all our troubles.”
An independent Kurdistan
Can an independent Kurdistan survive? Landlocked and dependent on oil exports, it will have to reach some kind of deal with one of its neighbors to allow it to ship the oil out. But they are all resolutely opposed to Kurdish independence. There are internal challenges as well. The KRG’s political system is deeply divided between the main dynasties that control the political parties. Corruption is rife and the Peshmerga militia is a brave fighting force, which for two years, as the Iraqi army crumbled, was the only one opposing ISIS, but it also includes tens of thousands of ageing veterans who are paid pensions while moonlighting as security guards. Lacking sufficient heavy weaponry, the Peshmerga will be hard pressed to defend Kurdistan should Turkey or Iran decide to invade, with or without the invitation of the Iraqi government.
One country the Kurds are hoping to receive assistance from is Israel, which was one of the first customers for their oil. While some Israeli politicians have openly expressed support for Kurdish independence, the government has been careful not to take a position. There are a number of advantages for Israel in an independent Kurdistan. Its location astride Iran’s route to Syria and Lebanon is just the most obvious one. Kurdistan would be a headache not just for Iran, but for other potential rivals including Iraq, Turkey and Syria. Israeli businessmen are already welcome in Erbil, and the development needs of a new emerging and potentially pro-western nation would be worth billions. But Israel is loath at this point to do anything without coordination with the Americans.
Israel is also gingerly trying to rebuild the once strategic relationship with Turkey. Diplomatic ties have been renewed but there is still a long way to go before the level of cooperation the countries once had can be restored. As it stands, Turkey is the only neighbor of the Kurds with which Israel has open relations and through which the Kurdish oil can be shipped. In the short-term, the Kurds can create a lot of problems for Israel’s rivals in the region but for any long-term prospect of a regional alliance which will keep Iran out, Israel needs Turkey and Kurdistan to come to an understanding. The referendum won’t help that happen and the Kurdish expectations that Israel will swiftly recognize their independence are probably unfounded for now.
Peshmerga har publicerat en kort film som de hittade på en död kalifatkrigare. Den ger en annan bild av jihadisterna än deras välredigerade propagandafilmer...
Kalifen al-Baghdadis tyska hustru Diane Krüger befinner sig på flykt undan makens terrorstat. Tillsammans med två kvinnliga följeslagare uppges hon nu befinna sig på område kontrollerat av Asadregimen. Diane Krüger hade en hög position som kvinnoledare i kalifatet och utfärdade bl a egna fatwor för kvinnor. Hennes flykt anses som en allvarlig prestigeförlust för kalifen, som redan drabbats av flera militära bakslag.
The German wife of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has fled the territory controlled by the organization in Iraq, arousing a commotion within the organization's leadership, Iraqi media reported on Sunday.
The wife, Diane Kruger, has reportedly fled ISIS territory accompanied by two girls who helped her, and her current location is not known. Following the incident, Baghdadi appointed a special emergency force to look for her, ordering the fighters to arrest Kruger and the people with her.
According to the reports, Kruger served as the head of ISIS' women’s department, where she administered women's day to day life in ISIS-controlled territories and issued sharia-based decrees relating to women.
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Iraqi media also reported that Baghdadi's wife was in charge of a special military camp for women ISIS had established in the city of Kirkuk in order to train women to carry out suicide operations.
The ISIS leader reportedly married Kruger in October 2015 in the province of Ninawa. Following the marriage, German intelligence services provided their Iraqi counterparts with information regarding Kruger.
en person är anhållen i sin frånvaro misstänkt för terrorbrott. Efterspaningen leds av säkerhetspolisen, men Säpo vill inte lämna någon information om vem mannen är.
– Vi går inte in på vårt operativa arbete, förundersökningssekretess råder, säger Fredrik Milder, pressekreterare hos Säpo.
Under onsdagskvällen stod det klart att polisen söker en person misstänkt för terrorbrott, något som polisen själva berättar om på sin hemsida. Det är säkerhetspolisen som leder arbetet med en förundersökning och den misstänkte personen är anhållen i sin frånvaro.
SVT Nyheter berättar att det finns uppgifter som säger att den eftersökte mannen är i 25-års åldern och är av irakiskt ursprung. SVT skriver även att en bild på den misstänkte ska gå ut till poliser i yttre tjänst under onsdagskvällen.
The rapid advance across Syria and Iraq by militant fighters from Islamic State (IS) in 2014 threw the region into chaos and led to US air strikes against their key positions.
The jihadist group, which has fighters from across the world, announced the establishment of a "caliphate" - an Islamic state - stretching from Aleppo in Syria to the province of Diyala in Iraq.
The US went on to assemble a coalition to fight the militants, and has launched more than 2,600 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since the campaign began on 8 August 2014. The UK launched its first air strikes on 30 September 2014.
In neighbouring Syria, the US, along with Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has also carried out more than 1,600 attacks on IS-held areas since 23 September 2014.
US President Barack Obama has warned his coalition allies they are facing a "long-term campaign".
Militants from abroad
The US Central Intelligence Agency believes IS may have up to 31,000 fighters in the region, many of whom are foreign recruits. Figures from the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and the New York-based Soufan Group show an estimated 20,000 fighters from almost 80 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with extremist groups.
The figures suggest that while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority are from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Morocco.
Battlegrounds
The latest key battleground is around the Iraqi city of Ramadi, in Anbar province, which IS seized in mid May.
Iran-backed Shia militias have been ordered to recapture the city, which lies only 70 miles (112km) west of the capital, Baghdad.
But a month after the city fell, the US announced it was sending 450 more troops to a base in Anbar province to advise the Iraqis on how to retake Ramadi. Tikrit battle
The Shia militias were key to the recapture from IS of another city, Tikrit, in April after it had been held for more than eight months.
The Iraqi government declared a "magnificent victory" over Islamic State militants after a month-long operation. Another battleground has been the fight for the Kurdish town of Kobane, on the border between Syria and Turkey.
Thousands of residents were forced into Turkey to flee the fighting, while coalition airstrikes targeted the advancing Islamic State fighters.
After months of fighting, in which about 1,600 people died, US Central Command announced in January 2015 that Kurdish forces controlled 90% of the town.
In June 2015, the Kurdish fighters known as the People's Protection Units (YPG) announced they had seized control of Tal Abyad, a border town to the east, from IS. The move is seen as key to securing the main road south to IS's headquarters in Raqqa.
It also extends the gains by the YPG across the north of the country. Strategic importance of Kobane IS fighters targeted a number of Iraqi dams during their advance, capturing the facility at Falluja in April 2014. They went on to take Mosul dam in August, before US air strikes helped force them out later that month. Iraq's key dams IS fighters also attacked the country's second largest dam at Haditha, but the area was secured by Iraqi forces In September.
In the course of its offensives in Iraq and Syria in June 2014, IS gained control of much of the oil infrastructure.
These refineries and the fields supplying them with oil have played a vital role in fuelling IS military units and in generating revenue for the group.
The coalition has targeted these locations in an attempt to damage IS capabilities. Oil infrastructure across Syria and Iraq
Refugees
Almost four million people have fled abroad to escape the fighting in Syria. Most have gone to Lebanon and Turkey - but a significant number have also gone to Iraq.
Syrian refugees have put pressure on local services and infrastructure in Iraq - which is also having to cope with the return of many Iraqi refugees from Syria.
In addition, the UN estimates there are more than 2m Iraqis who have been forced to leave their homes to escape the conflict and are displaced within the country or elsewhere.
