måndag, oktober 05, 2009

Att satsa på det minst onda i Iran ?

Är "oppositionsledaren" Mir Hossein Mousavi en blid,
fredsälskande humanist beredd att föra Iran mot en
demokratisk framtid, eller...?
Finns det ett "moderat islamistiskt" alternativ till
Ahmadinejads skräckvälde ?
Iranexperten Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis tror inte på den
populära mediabilden.
I Foreign Policy Journal juli 2009 ("The CIA’s involvement in
Iran Today: A Realistic Assessment") förklarar han varför:
Mir Hossein Mousavi, who is seen by many in the West as
personifying the Iranian reform movement, perfectly
illustrates the CIA’s replacement dilemma.
The Agency maintains a voluminous intelligence file on this
architect-turned-politician, who was Iran’s Prime Minister
from 1981 to 1989. Mousavi is generally considered one
of the most committed ideological supporters of the 1979
revolution. Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Mousavi
personally appointed his right-hand aide, Ali Akbar
Mohtashemi-Pur, Iran’s ambassador to Syria. It was
Mohtashemi-Pur who, according to the US National
Security Agency, oversaw the founding of Lebanese
Hezbollah, and who helped orchestrate some of the
group’s most spectacular military operations.
Former CIA agent Robert Baer, who operated for several
years in Lebanon, believes that “Mousavi [...] almost
certainly had a hand in the planning of the Iranian-
backed truck-bombing attacks on the US embassy in
April 1983 and the Marine barracks in October of
that same year”. Later in the 1980s, it was Mousavi,
along with another Iranian reformist, Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, who mediated between the
US and Hezbollah during the guns-for-hostages
stage of the Iran-Contra scandal.
Mousavi’s less-than-ideal background goes to show
that, in Baer’s words, he “is far from the liberal
democrat that many in the West would like to
believe he is”.
A more accurate description of Mousavi’s current
dispute with the Iranian leadership is that of a
“family feud”, as Israeli professor David Menashri
has put it. Mousavi is one of several feuding children
of the Iranian revolution who are “now challenging
its authority”, but are not opposed to the leadership
of Iran’s clerical elite, nor do they propose radical
shifts in the country’s strategic objectives, including
its nuclear agenda.
Considering the above, it should hardly be surprising
if many in the CIA prefer preserving the stability of
Iran’s existing regime, rather than subverting it in
favor of a new leadership that would maintain
Iran’s nuclear ambitions while enjoying far broader
popular support among Iranians. Representatives
of Israel’s intelligence establishment, which has been
somewhat more successful than the CIA in penetrating
Iran’s security infrastructure, have actually argued
publicly in favor of Ahmadinejad’s electoral success.
Speaking on June 18 before the Foreign Affairs and
Defense Committee of the Israeli Knesset, the director
of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, said that “[i]f Mousavi had
won [the elections], Israel would have a more serious
problem because it would need to explain to the world
the danger of the Iranian threat. Mousavi is perceived
internationally as a moderate element [compared to
President Ahmadinejad]”